Capital Markets: Observations & Insights

Autumn 2018

Capital Markets: Observations and Insights Capital Markets: Observations and Insights The Longest Expansion

The Longest Expansion

“I always thought that record would stand until it was broken.” – Yogi Berra

Could the current U.S. expansion be record breaking? We think so. The current cycle is over nine years old. If it persists past the second quarter of 2019, it will be the longest on record, surpassing the 1990s period. While it would undoubtedly make headlines, a record-breaking U.S. expansion would not be surprising to us for several reasons. First, economic cycles are lasting longer as the economy changes structurally to being more service-oriented. Second, technological changes, such as increased automation and price transparency, are mitigating traditional inventory and inflation cycles. Lastly, the depth of the last downturn and the modest rate of subsequent expansion means that the U.S. economy took longer to reach its potential output. One thing is for sure: if this current U.S. expansion sets a new record, it will last…until it is broken. Given the trends prolonging economic cycles, we may see many more record breakers in our lifetimes.

Daniel C. Chung, CFA Chief Executive Officer Chief Investment Officer

Brad Neuman, CFA Senior Vice President Director of Market Strategy

Page 1

Key Observations

• While the U.S. economic expansion is relatively old compared to history, multiple data points suggest that growth should continue, making the current cycle the longest in U.S. history • Monetary conditions are tightening but stocks and the economy should be able to absorb moderate increases in interest rates • Business spending is accelerating and driving the broader economy, bolstered by strong earnings growth, tax reform, solid business confidence, and accommodative lending conditions

Table of Contents

The Longest Expansion

Pages 3-8

Performance

Pages 9-16

Fundamentals

Pages 17-23

Valuation

Pages 24-28

Page 2

The Upside of Being Slow ​ The Longest Expansion

• Why has the current economic expansion lasted so long and when will it end?

‒ A big part of the answer is the depth of the recession that preceded it and the rate of the recovery thus far ‒ Economic recoveries of comparable length have had far more growth than the present one, suggesting a long runway of economic expansion now

60%

1960

50%

1990

40%

1981

30%

Long runway to catch up?

1973

20%

1969

2001

Current

10%

0%

Real Cumulative GDP Growth

-10%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

40

42

Number of Quarters from Peak

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and Alger as of September 2018. Dates indicate beginning of measurement periods.

Page 3

Monetary Policy Is Not Restrictive ​ The Longest Expansion

• Over the past half century, every U.S. recession has been preceded by a significantly positive real Fed Funds rate of 2% or higher

• In contrast, today we have a real Fed Funds rate of close to 0%

Real Federal Funds Rate

15%

10%

Today real short-term interest rates are far

5%

lower than what induced previous recessions

0%

-5%

-10%

1960

1962

1965

1967

1970

1972

1975

1977

1980

1982

1985

1987

1990

1992

1995

1997

2000

2002

2005

2007

2010

2012

2015

2017

Source: FactSet as of September 2018. Real Federal Funds rate is equal to the Federal Funds rate less the year-over-year change in the PCE Price Index ex-food and energy. Shaded regions denote U.S. recessions.

Page 4

Cycles Have Been Lasting Longer ​ The Longest Expansion

• U.S. economic expansions have been increasing in duration. Driving factors include: ‒ Increased fiscal and monetary intervention ‒ Structural changes in the economy ‒ Technological advances such as improved inventory management

Age of U.S. Economic Expansions

12

10

8

6

4

Years of Expansion

2

0

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Source: FactSet. Note: double-dip recession in early 1980s accounted for as one long recession.

Page 5

Take It to the Limit? ​ The Longest Expansion

• Other countries have experienced much longer economic expansions

Expansion

‒ Including developed economies such as Australia (27+ years)

Technical Recession

Data Not Available

Source: OECD. The definition of technical recession is two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth – this differs from other sources such as the NBER, which determines when recessions occurred in the U.S. Data through 2Q18.

Page 6

Business Spending to Accelerate Further ​ The Longest Expansion

• Drivers of faster growth in corporate expenditures include:

‒ Strong profit growth

‒ Tax reform—lower statutory rates, foreign profit repatriation, accelerated depreciation

‒ Higher business confidence—driven in part by lower regulation and certainty about taxes

‒ Accommodative financial conditions—banks’ willingness to lend and low credit spreads

Business Spending

15%

Robust earnings growth should help drive an acceleration in business spending

10%

5%

0%

Y-ear-over-Year Growth

-5%

1Q16

2Q16

3Q16

4Q16

1Q17

2Q17

3Q17

4Q17

1Q18

2Q18

3Q18

4Q18

1Q19

2Q19

Source: FactSet. Business spending is U.S. private fixed nonresidential investment with estimates (dotted line) based on a regression with S&P 500 EPS.

Page 7

Better to Be Behind? ​ The Longest Expansion

• The output gap measures economic output relative to potential, with a lower output gap indicating more growth left in the cycle • While most major regions are at or near potential output, some, such as Japan and Europe, are further behind the U.S.

U.S. Output Gap

1%

4%

U.S.

Economy Above Potential

2%

0%

China

0%

Europe Japan

-1%

-2%

-4%

-2%

Economy Below Potential

(GDP / Potential GDP) - 1

-6%

-8%

1980

1982

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2016

2018

Source: FactSet and Oxford Economics. Shaded regions indicate U.S. recessions.

Page 8

Technology-Related Companies Lead ​ Performance

• Growth-oriented sectors, such as consumer discretionary, technology, and health care, have outperformed this year

3Q18 Returns (%)

YTD Returns (%)

U.S.

World

U.S.

World

16

25

20

12

15

8

10

4

5

0

0

-4

-5

-8

-10

Energy

Energy

Utilities

Utilities

Materials

Materials

Financials

Financials

Industrials

Industrials

Technology

Real Estate

Technology

Real Estate

Health Care

Health Care

Consumer Staples

Consumer Staples

Consumer Discretionary

Consumer Discretionary

Communication Services

Communication Services

Source: FactSet as of 9/30/18. U.S. represented by S&P 500 and World represented by MSCI AC World Index in USD.

Page 9

Value Has Lagged ​ Performance

• Year-to-date, value factors have generally underperformed

3Q18 Excess Return (%)

YTD Excess Return (%)

1.4

3.6

1.2

2.6

1.4

0.3

0.0 0.0

0.0

0.0 -0.1

-0.2

-0.5 -0.8

-0.5

-1.3 -1.4 -1.4 -1.5

-0.7

-1.5

-3.6

Market Cap

Book / Price

EPS Growth

Market Cap

Debt / Equity

Book / Price

EPS Growth

Debt / Equity

Price Volatility

Dividend Yield

Price Volatility

Dividend Yield

Trading Activity

Earnings / Price

Revenue / Price

Trading Activity

Earnings / Price

Revenue / Price

Relative Strength

Relative Strength

Earnings Variability

Earnings Variability

Source: FactSet as of 9/30/18 using Northfield defined quantitative factors for the Northfield broad U.S. market database.

Page 10

The Earnings Growth Explosion Is Driving Performance ​ Performance

Total Return = Dividend Yield + EPS Growth +/- P/E Change

MSCI All Country World Index ex-USA

S&P 500

Dividend

EPS Growth*

P/E Change

Dividend

EPS Growth*

P/E Change

35%

25%

30%

20%

25%

15%

20%

10%

15%

5%

10%

0%

5%

EPS Growth Explosion

-5%

0%

EPS Growth Explosion

-10%

-5%

-15%

-10%

-15%

-20%

Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18

Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16 Sep-17 Sep-18

12- Month Total Return:

12- Month Total Return:

30%

19%

20%

-1%

15%

19%

18%

14%

21%

11%

-1%

7%

20%

5%

Source: FactSet as of 9/30/18. *Based on consensus estimates of next 12-month EPS. Actual earnings per share might be materially different than shown. MSCI ACWI ex-US performance based on local currency.

Page 11

​ Performance

Structural Issues Driving Growth vs. Value

• Growth stocks have dramatically outperformed (+50%) Value stocks over the past decade

• The culprit for value investors has been the very weak performance of buying low P/B stocks, while low P/E strategies have fared much better • Book value, used heavily in index classification of Growth vs. Value, may no longer be as relevant given changing business models, e.g. R&D is not capitalized in book value

100 105 110

P/B, not P/E, has driven Value underperformance

60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

P/E

P/B

Russell 1000 Value / Growth

Total Return Index

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Source: FactSet as of 9/30/18. Price-to-earnings and price-to-book returns are based on the E/P and B/P Northfield factors for the Northfield broad U.S. market database.

Page 12

​ Performance

Innovative Companies Often Outperform

• Studies have shown, and our research demonstrates, that the most innovative companies grow their sales, earnings, and stock prices faster*

Innovation Drives Outperformance

600

Most Innovative +18.4% / year

500

400

300

Least Innovative +9.8% / year

200

100

-

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Source: FactSet. Most/least innovative stock performance is derived from highest and lowest S&P 1500 quintiles based on R&D as % of sales, normalized for market value, using one month returns for 10 years ending 7/30/18. * Baruch Lev and Suresh Radhakrishnan, “The Stock Market Valuation of R&D Leaders.”

Page 13

The Great Fund Flow Rotation? ​ Performance

• Fund flows in bonds have dramatically outperformed those into equities over the past decade—nearly $2 trillion to less than a quarter of a trillion dollars • If interest rates are rising and bond underperformance continues, equities could be due to benefit from the great fund flow rotation • Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the bull market would end without first seeing much stronger flows into stocks as has historically been the case

2.5

Bonds

Equities

2.0

1.5

When will investors turn from bonds to stocks?

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

Cumulative Fund Flows ($T)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018 YTD

Source: Morningstar. Equity fund flows represent Morningstar category of U.S. Equity mutual funds and ETFs and bond flows represent Morningstar category of Taxable Bonds mutual funds and ETFs. Data through August 2018.

Page 14

​ Performance

Has Active Relative Performance Troughed?

• As some of those factors reverse, active management has been doing better ‒ Interest rates rising/bond-like equities underperforming ‒ Small caps performing better ‒ Market performance more subdued

• Powerful cyclical factors impact U.S. active relative performance: ‒ Interest rates/bond-like equities ‒ Small cap performance

‒ Overall market performance ‒ Non-U.S. stock performance

% of U.S. Large Cap Active Managers Outperforming YTD

Active Relative Performance Is Cyclical

100%

57%

55%

80%

60%

24%

40%

20% % of Fund Assets Outperforming

0%

Growth

Core

Value

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

Source: Left chart: Nomura/Instinet, Joseph Mezrich and FactSet through 9/30/18. Fund performance is trailing five-year data of U.S. active equity mutual funds in existence for five years or more and part of the growth, growth & income, and income categories based on CRSP codes. Right chart: Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. Equity and U.S. Quant Strategy using Lipper data relative to Russell benchmarks through 9/30/18.

Page 15

​ Performance

Risk Relative to Time Horizon

• Equity returns look much less volatile over a longer time period than shorter time periods

‒ Using 20-year rolling annualized returns, the minimum equity return has been higher than that of bonds while the standard deviation for equities is less than 1% higher

60

Stocks

Range of Stock and Bond Total Returns

52.3%

Bonds

50

40

29.1%

28.6%

30

19.2%

17.9%

17.0%

20

13.1%

10.0%

10

6.5%

0

2.4%

Annual Total Returns

1.3%

0.9%

-1.4%

-2.4%

-5.1%

-10

-20

-30

-40

-37.0%

1-Year

5-Year Rolling

10-Year Rolling

20-Year Rolling

Source: Morningstar. Stock data is the S&P 500 total return and bond data is the Ibbotson Associates US IT Govt total return. Data spans 1950-2017 on an annual basis.

Page 16

Global Policy Rates Are Low ​ Fundamentals

• While many central banks such as the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the U.K. have been raising interest rates… • Central bank policy rates around the world are still relatively low, even in real terms, where many are at or below zero including the Euro Area and Japan

= current

Central Bank Policy Rates 2007-2018

= historical range

15%

10%

Policy rates are still low

5%

0%

-5%

Source: Bank for International Settlements. Data is through July 2018.

Page 17

​ Fundamentals

Leading Indicators Suggest Continued Expansion

• The LEI historically leads S&P 500 EPS by 6-18 months

• Typically, changes in the Leading Economic Index (LEI) have preceded changes in economic growth • The rate of change of the LEI implies strong economic growth

• The record LEI reading in 3Q18 suggests EPS have room to run

15%

8%

$190

10%

6%

110

$170

5%

4%

GDP Growth YoY

100

$150

0%

2%

S&P 500 EPS

18 Month Lead

$130

-5%

0%

90

$110

-10%

-2%

$90

-15%

-4%

80

Leading Economic Index

-20%

-6%

$70

Leading Economic Index YoY

-25%

-8%

70

$50

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Source: FactSet, Conference Board. EPS estimates based on next 12-months consensus.

Page 18

Fundamentals

U.S. Debt Service Is Historically Low

• Despite higher levels of debt as a % of GDP, the U.S. non-financial private sector debt service ratio is much lower than in the past two recessions ‒ Because more than 80% of U.S. consumer and business debt is fixed, higher interest rates should not have a dramatic impact on service costs

U.S. Debt Service Ratio

20%

18%

Debt service ratio indicates households and corporations are not burdened by debt payments

16%

14%

12%

10%

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Source: Bank for International Settlements, September 2018. Debt Service Ratio is the share of income used for interest payments and amortizations in the non-financial private sector. Shaded regions indicate recessions.

Page 19

​ Fundamentals

Economic Outlook

Tailwinds

• Robust corporate profits

• Strong business and consumer confidence

• Strengthening corporate spending

• Solid U.S. consumer balance sheet

Headwinds

• Tightening monetary policy

• Trade wars

• Rising U.S. labor costs

• China growth slowdown

• Geopolitical risk

Page 20

A Powerful Trend ​ Fundamentals

• There have been various periods in history marked by fears of “trade wars” but ultimately countries have acted rationally and reduced trade barriers • While there may be more pain to come, we believe the powerful trend toward lower tariffs and more trade will prevail • In the meantime, fiscal stimulus likely exceeds trade headwinds and active management may be able to take advantage of opportunities that arise

U.S. Tariff Rates

U.S. Gross International Trade % of GDP

8%

35%

30%

Japanese auto quotas imposed

6%

25%

20%

4%

Bush steel tariffs

15%

10%

2%

Chicken Tax / European trade dispute

5%

Time magazine cover on “Trade Wars”

0%

0%

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Alger. Tariffs are calculated as duties collected divided by total imports.

Page 21

Smaller Capitalization Stocks Poised to Outperform ​ Fundamentals

• Stronger fundamentals : Estimated small cap EPS growth for ‘18 & ‘19 is double that of large cap

• More levered to domestic economy : Small caps are more U.S.-oriented and have less exposure to international trade friction • Rising interest rates : Small caps have historically outperformed large caps in rising rate environments • Reasonable valuation : Small cap P/E multiple premium is reasonable relative to history while a large sales multiple discount implies opportunity

Price-to-Earnings Russell 2000 / Russell 1000

Earnings Per Share

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

R2000 R1000

180

Small caps growing faster

160

140

Median

120

EPS Indexed to 100

100

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2017

2018

2019

Source: FactSet as of September 2018. EPS for 2018-2019 are consensus estimates and actual earnings per share might be materially different than shown.

Page 22

​ Fundamentals

The Growth Advantage

• Three variables drive P/E multiples: growth, returns, and risk

• As compared to the Russell 1000 Value Index, the Russell 1000 Growth Index has higher expected EPS growth, higher return on equity, and lower risk in the form of better balance sheets

Stronger Growth

Higher Returns

Lower Risk

R1000G R1000V

R1000G R1000V

R1000G R1000V

27.5%

17.3%

2.6x

9.5%

12.3%

1.0x

Long-Term EPS Growth

Return on Equity

Net Debt / EBITDA

Source: FactSet as of 9/30/18. Growth represents consensus long-term analyst estimates and actual future EPS growth rates might be materially different than the forecasts shown.

Page 23

Addressing Rising Rate Concerns ​ Valuation

• Concern: Will rising interest rates weigh on P/E multiples?

• Our take: P/Es never priced in how low interest rates had become (see gap below) so we believe earnings multiples may not suffer when rates rise

S&P 500 EPS Yield

Treasury Bond Yield

16%

Interest rates can rise without impact on stock valuations

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

Nearly 300 bps

4%

2%

0%

1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

2018

Source: FactSet, Federal Reserve, and S&P, as of 9/30/18.

Page 24

Varying Premiums ​ Valuation

• Sector valuation varies with no sector trading at a significant discount to its historical median

P/E Relative to 20-Year Median

30%

20%

13%

11%

10%

7%

6%

5%

4%

3%

2%

-1%

Energy

Utilities

S&P 500

Materials

Financials

Industrials

Information

Technology

Consumer

Health Care

Communication Services

Real Estate

Discretionary

Consumer Staples

Source: FactSet and UBS, based on S&P 500 Index as of 9/30/18. Note that the Communications Services, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors’ historical data have been restated to reflect September 2018 changes to the GICS sector definitions.

Page 25

Growth and Value Near Equilibrium ​ Valuation

• Despite their recent outperformance, Growth stocks are not very expensive compared to their Value equity counterparts relative to expected growth rates or history

Russell 1000 Growth vs. Russell 1000 Value PEG Ratio (P/E Divided by Long-Term Growth Rate)

Russell 1000 Growth Relative to Russell 1000 Value P/E

Current premium not egregious and far below tech bubble

220%

1.5x

Growth stocks are cheaper relative to long-term growth

1.2x

51%

Russell 1000 Value

Russell 1000 Growth

Median

Source: FactSet, Bank of America as of 9/30/18.

Page 26

Global Equity Multiples Reasonable ​ Valuation

• Price-to-earnings multiples around the world are modestly higher than their historical average, which is reasonable relative to very low global interest rates

= current

Price-to-Earnings Multiple +/- 2 Standard Deviations from 15-Year Average

= +2 std dev

20x

= average

= -2 std dev

15x

EM is least expensive in

10x

absolute terms and relative to history

5x

S&P 500 MSCI AC World MSCI EAFE MSCI EM

Z-Score (Standard Deviations Above/Below Mean)

1.2

0.7

0.2

0.0

Source: FactSet. Monthly estimates over past 15 years ending 9/30/18. A Z-Score is the number of standard deviations a data point is from the mean. A z-score equal to zero, it is on the mean. If a z-score is equal to +1, it is 1 standard deviation above the mean.Standard deviation measures how much the portfolio’s return has deviated from its average historical return. If a portfolio has a high standard deviation, there have been large swings in its returns, and vice versa. Standard deviation is generally used to compare the relative risk of two portfolios or of a portfolio to a benchmark.

Page 27

​ Valuation Framework for Forecasting Returns

• There is a strong relationship between starting valuations and ensuing 10-year returns

• Current valuations suggest equities should materially outperform bonds over the coming decade

S&P 500 P/E vs. 10-Year Returns

Russell 1000 Growth P/E vs. 10-Year Returns

= month

= current

peak of tech bubble

25%

25%

R² = 0.79 (0.85 ex-tech bubble)

R² = 0.84

20%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

5%

5%

0%

0%

-5%

-5%

-10%

-10%

5

10

15

20

25

30

5

10

15

20

25

S&P 500 10-Year Annualized Return

Russell 1000G 10-Year Annualized Return

Russell 1000 Growth Price/Earnings

S&P 500 Price/Earnings

Source: FactSet. Each dot represents the P/E during that month and the returns generated over the subsequent 10 years. The starting P/E ratio is the price divided by the next 12- month earnings per share estimate at the start of each 10-year period measured. Monthly data through September 2018 and beginning in January 1986 (S&P 500) and December 1978 (Russell 1000 Growth). The tech bubble, represented by the 10-year returns beginning in April 1987-March 1990 and ending in April 1997-March 2000, skewed the regression by resulting in higher returns for given valuations than the historical relationship would imply.

Page 28

Disclosure ​The views expressed are the views of Fred Alger Management, Inc. as of October 2018. Alger has used sources of information which it believes to be reliable; however, this publication is not intended to be and does not constitute investment advice. These views are subject to change at any time and they do not guarantee the future performance of the markets, any security, or any funds managed by Fred Alger Management, Inc. These views should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell securities. Individual securities or industries/sectors mentioned, if any, should be considered in the context of an overall portfolio and therefore reference to them should not be construed as a recommendation or offer to purchase or sell securities. References to or implications regarding the performance of an individual security or group of securities are not intended as an indication of the characteristics or performance of any specific sector, industry, security, group of securities, or a portfolio and are for illustrative purposes only.

​ Risk Disclosures : Investing in the stock market involves gains and losses and may not be suitable for all investors. Growth stocks tend to be more volatile than other stocks as the prices of growth stocks tend to be higher in relation to their companies’ earnings and may be more sensitive to market, political and economic developments.

​The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the U.S. stock market without regard to company size. The S&P Composite 1500 is an unmanaged index that covers approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization. The Russell 1000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of the largest 1000 companies in the Russell 3000 Index with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 Growth Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of common stocks designed to track performance of small- capitalization companies with greater than average growth orientation. The Russell 2000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the small-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe and measures the performance of Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of those Russell 3000® Index companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of stocks from the Russell 3000 Index with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth rates. The MSCI ACWI Index (gross) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed and emerging markets. The MSCI ACWI consists of 45 country indices comprising 24 developed and 21 emerging market country indices. The MSCI ACWI ex USA Index (gross) captures large and mid cap representation across 23 of 24 Developed Markets (DM) countries excluding the US) and 23 Emerging Markets (EM) countries. The index covers approximately 85% of the global equity opportunity set outside the US. The indices presented are provided for illustrative purposes, reflect the reinvestment of dividends and do not assess fees and expenses that would have the effect of reducing returns. Investors cannot invest directly in any index. The index performance does not represent the returns of any portfolio advised by Fred Alger Management, Inc. and actual client results might differ materially than the indices shown. Note that past performance is no guarantee of future results. Comparison to a different index might have materially different results than those shown. ​Frank Russell Company (“Russell”) is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell ® is a trademark of Frank Russell Company. Neither Russell nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings or underlying data and no party may rely on any Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings and / or underlying data contained in this communication. No further distribution of Russell Data is permitted without Russell’s express written consent. Russell does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. ​ ALCAPPRESSPR-1018 Fred Alger Management, Inc. • 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010 • 800.992.3863 • www.alger.com Page 29