Capital Markets: Observations and Insights

Summer 2019

Capital Markets: Observations and Insights Capital Markets: Observations and Insights Reframing Risk

Reframing Risk

“The word ‘risk’ derives from the early Italian risicare , which means ‘to dare.’ In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate.” – Peter L. Bernstein

At Alger we think about risk somewhat differently. For most the primary measures of risk are statistically accepted metrics such as downside capture, beta, and standard deviation. While we monitor those metrics, we believe they are an imperfect shorthand intended to capture fundamental risk. To us, risk is the chance of loss. In such a rapidly changing world, that could be the risk of getting disrupted as innovation strikes. In that sense statistically cheap stocks may not provide investors with protection. Even historically less volatile stocks, such as consumer staples, are proving to be more prone to risk than conventional measures would suggest. In our view, it is a mistake to think of risk only in the context of the economic cycle as we have seen time and time again that innovation is often more powerful. We believe those companies benefitting from change will serve to mitigate investor risk while those on the losing side are likely to create undue risk, particularly in a weak economy.

We believe that understanding how innovation and change are likely to play out is the best risk mitigation tool.

Daniel C. Chung, CFA Chief Executive Officer Chief Investment Officer

Brad Neuman, CFA Senior Vice President Director of Market Strategy

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Key Observations and Themes

Reframing Risk Traditionally accepted metrics are part of an imperfect shorthand intended to capture fundamental risk. We believe risk should be evaluated in the context of fundamental durability. Younger than It Looks While the economic expansion is chronologically old, many metrics are closer to middle age than senior. We believe the end of the expansion is not imminent. Style Divergence Powerful structural forces are causing Growth to diverge from Value. Investors looking for a reversion to the mean may be disappointed. Accelerating Innovation Innovation is speeding up and changing the way the economy behaves, increasingly driving stock performance.

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The Search for Yield Falling interest rates are driving investors to seek out yield, even in equities.

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Additional Insights A framework for forecasting future stock returns and more.

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Page 2

The Downside of Downside Capture ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• Low downside capture is thought to reduce risk, but over reasonably long periods, strong secular growth can provide superior returns, even in down markets

Low Downside Capture Can Underperform Secular Growth in Both Bull and Bear Markets

Downside Capture

Annual Return

Performance During Bear Market (3 years ended 12/31/2009)

Performance During Bull Market (3 years ended 6/30/2019)

-20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140%

120%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%

35%

100%

Downside Capture

Downside Capture

80%

25%

60%

15%

40%

20%

5%

Annual Return

Annual Return

0%

-2% -1%

-5%

-20%

Electric Utilities Internet Retail

Telecom Software

Source: FactSet. The figures presented are provided for illustrative purposes. They include examples of the performance of two industries with downside captures above and below 100%, respectively. Examples of such performance during a bull market and bear market are provided. Please note that using different industries or different time periods might have materially different results than those shown above. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

Page 3

Beyond Beta ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• Beta is thought to be a good measure of risk but in practice it is backward looking in nature, making it a poor measure of potential losses ‒ At the tech bubble peak, the beta of technology stocks was less than one; the same was true of financials in early 2008 prior to the Global Financial Crisis

Below Market Risk at Height of Tech Bubble?

Below Market Risk Preceding the Mortgage Meltdown?

S&P 500 Technology Sector

S&P 500 Financial Sector

120%

40%

2.5

3.0

90%

20%

1.0

2.0

60%

0%

Beta

Beta

-0.5

1.0

30%

-20%

-2.0

0.0

0%

-40% Relative Return

Relative Return

-30%

-60%

-3.5

-1.0

Source: FactSet. Beta calculated relative to S&P 500 on 12-month trailing basis. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

Page 4

Passive Problems? ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• The vast majority of passive investing allows relative performance to drive relative weighting changes, irrespective of fundamentals ‒ This can exacerbate problems such as in Tech in the late 1990s or in Financials prior to the Global Financial Crisis

Passive Proves Problematic at Points

40%

300

30%

250

Peak Weighting, Wrong Time

Peak Weighting, Wrong Time

S&P 500 Tech Relative Performance

S&P 500 Financial Relative Performance

30%

200

20%

150

20%

100

10%

50

10%

S&P 500 Tech Weight

S&P 500 Financial Weight

0%

-

0%

-50

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Source: FactSet. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

Page 5

Fundamentals vs. Valuation ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• Instead of using statistics, investors should think of risk as the chance of loss or the probability that the bear case comes to fruition

• But what is more important when assessing risk—fundamentals or valuation?

Change During Recessions

EPS

P/E

Historically, recessions hurt EPS more than P/Es

-2%

-24%

Source: FactSet. Average of past three U.S. recessions beginning three months prior to the start of each of the official recession periods.

Page 6

Not All Fundamentals Are Created Equally ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• Understanding the downside to sales, earnings, and cash flows in a difficult economic environment is key to understanding risk in portfolios ‒ Value stocks have often acted like sailboats that depend on the wind of economic activity, while Growth stocks enjoy a secular motor to help protect against volatility

Look for Stocks Where Fundamentals May Prove Resilient

S&P 500 Growth

S&P 500 Value

S&P 500 Growth

S&P 500 Value

20%

20%

0%

0%

-20%

-20%

-40%

-40%

Change in EPS

Change in EPS

-60%

-60%

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Months After Beginning of 2001 Recession

Months After Beginning of 2008 Recession

Source: FactSet.

Page 7

Beating Economic Volatility? ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• Innovation can triumph over economic volatility

‒ History shows that there are areas of innovation and growth throughout recessions, depressions, and panics over the past 150 years*

‒ This may be why Growth stock fundamentals have held up better in recessions

U.S. Internet Ad Revenue

U.S. E-Commerce

U.S. Total Retail Sales

140

130

120

+30% Growth

110

100

90

80

Q208

Q308

Q408

Q109

Q209

Q309

Q409

Q110

Q210

Q310

Q410

Q111

Q211

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, PwC, Census Bureau. *See Alger’s white paper “The Enduring Force of Innovation.”

Page 8

Focusing on Fundamentals ​ Reframing Risk

RISK

• When it comes to areas of innovation, fundamentals prove more important than valuation metrics

Innovation Changes the Rules of Valuation—Higher P/Es Yield Higher Returns?

Source: FactSet for the three-year period ended 6/30/19, based on GICS industries of the S&P 1500 Index.

Page 9

Younger than It Looks

ECONOMY

Cycles Have Been Lasting Longer

• U.S. economic expansions have been increasing in duration. Driving factors include: ‒ Increased fiscal and monetary intervention (e.g., tax cuts/spending and assertive Fed)

‒ Structural changes in the economy (e.g., larger proportion of services) ‒ Technological advances (e.g., improved inventory management)

Age of U.S. Economic Expansions

12

Entering Record Territory

10

8

6

4

Years of Expansion

2

0

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Source: FactSet and Alger. Note: double-dip recession in early 1980s accounted for as one recession.

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Younger than It Looks

ECONOMY

Cyclical Spending Signals More Expansion

• The cyclical components of GDP – business investment, residential investment, and consumer durables – have historically risen much higher prior to economic peaks

• The implication is that the economic expansion has room to expand

Cyclical Components % of GDP

Low cyclical spending may indicate room for expansion

30%

28%

26%

Average

24% % of GDP

22%

20%

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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Younger than It Looks

ECONOMY

Low Debt Burden

• Despite higher levels of debt as a % of GDP, the U.S. non-financial private sector debt service ratio is much lower than in the past two recessions ‒ Because more than 80% of U.S. consumer and business debt is fixed, higher interest rates would not have a dramatic impact on service costs

U.S. Debt Service Ratio

Debt service ratio indicates households and corporations are not burdened by debt payments

20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Source: Bank for International Settlements, June 2019. Debt Service Ratio is the share of income used for interest payments and amortizations in the non-financial private sector. Shaded regions indicate recessions.

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Younger than It Looks

ECONOMY

Follow The Leader

• The Leading Economic Index is a good indicator of future economic growth or lack thereof

• Historically, it has declined on a year-over-year basis leading up to a recession

• Currently, it is rising, indicating continued economic growth, albeit at a slower pace

Leading Economic Index Prior to U.S. Recessions Year-over-Year % Change

2.5%

Leading economic index

does not indicate recession

-1.3% -1.0%

-1.6%

-2.0%

-4.2%

Average is -3.4%

-5.8%

-7.7%

Jul '81

Jul '90

Jan '80

Mar '01

Current

Dec '69

Nov '73

Dec '07

Source: The Conference Board and Alger analysis as of June 2019.

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​ Style Divergence

STYLE DIVERGENCE

Structural Issues Driving Growth vs. Value

• Growth stocks have dramatically outperformed (>30%) Value stocks over the past decade

• The driver has been the very weak performance of the valuation metric Price-to-Book, which is used heavily in index classifications of Growth vs. Value stocks • As accounting fails to keep up with the changing economy, book value may no longer be as relevant (e.g., R&D is not capitalized in book value)

120

Style classification too dependent upon flawed book value

100

Low P/B

80

Russell 1000 Value / Growth

60

40

20

Total Return Index

0

2009

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

Source: FactSet as of 6/30/19. Low price-to-book returns are based on the B/P Northfield factor for the Northfield broad U.S. market database. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

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​ Style Divergence

STYLE DIVERGENCE

The Growth Advantage

• Three variables drive P/E multiples: growth, return on capital, and risk

• As compared to the Russell 1000 Value Index, the Russell 1000 Growth Index has higher expected EPS growth, higher return on equity, and lower risk in the form of better balance sheets

Stronger Growth

Higher Returns

Lower Risk

R1000G R1000V

R1000G R1000V

R1000G R1000V

14.3%

2.7x

30.9%

8.3%

1.0x

12.1%

Long-Term EPS Growth

Return on Equity

Net Debt / EBITDA

Source: FactSet as of 6/30/19. Growth represents consensus long-term analyst estimates and actual future EPS growth rates might be materially different than the forecasts shown.

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​ Style Divergence

STYLE DIVERGENCE

Growth and Value Near Equilibrium

• Despite their outperformance over the past several years, Growth stocks are not very expensive compared to their Value equity counterparts relative to expected growth rates or history

Russell 1000 Growth vs. Russell 1000 Value PEG Ratio (P/E Divided by Long-Term Growth Rate)

Russell 1000 Growth Relative to Russell 1000 Value P/E

1.7x

Growth stocks are cheaper relative to long-term growth

1.5x

48%

Median

Russell 1000 Value

Russell 1000 Growth

Source: FactSet, Bank of America as of 6/30/19. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

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​ Accelerating Innovation

INNOVATION

Stepping on the Gas

• Research has shown that innovation is accelerating across many areas of the economy

• As a result new products and services are diffusing through society faster, disrupting businesses at a greater pace

Years from Market Entry to 50% Penetration

Years to Reach 1 Billion Users

Source: Asymco, Visual Capitalist, company disclosures.

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​ Accelerating Innovation

INNOVATION

A New, More Powerful Driver of Disruption

• Moore’s Law, the doubling of transistors on a microchip every two years, has been the driving force of the global digital revolution • Now a new exponential law for artificial intelligence (AI) is set to usher in even larger, more powerful changes in technology and living standards

Exponential Growth in the Training of Artificial Intelligence Programs

AI program training doubling every 3 to 5 months

Source: OpenAI.

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​ Accelerating Innovation

INNOVATION

Innovation Deflation

• While low unemployment should indicate inflation pressures, we believe innovation in the form of pricing transparency, new business models, and automation is driving down inflation

‒ An indication of this dynamic is the declining correlation of wages and inflation

Correlation of Wages and Inflation

88%

Wages are having less impact on prices likely because of innovation

60%

1960-1999

2000-2018

Source: Alger analysis, U.S. Bureau of Economic Statistics, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Wages are year-over-year change in unit labor costs and inflation is year-over-year change in PCE price deflator ex-food & energy.

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Innovation as Wealth Creator ​ Accelerating Innovation

INNOVATION

• Studies have shown and our research demonstrates that the most innovative companies grow their sales, earnings, and stock prices faster*

Innovation Drives Excess Performance 10 Years

Most Innovative +4% per year

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

Least Innovative -4% per year

-40%

Cumulative Excess Return

-60%

Source: FactSet. Most/least innovative stock excess performance is derived from highest and lowest S&P 1500 quintiles based on R&D as % of sales, normalized for market value, using one month returns for 10 years ending 4/30/19. * Baruch Lev and Suresh Radhakrishnan, “The Stock Market Valuation of R&D Leaders.” The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

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Paying to Lend ​ The Search for Yield

YIELD

• Weakening global economic activity due in part to the trade war along with secularly low inflation has weighed on interest rates, driving record negative yielding debt

Worldwide Negative Yielding Debt

Record $13 trillion in negative yielding debt!

$14

$12

$10

$8

$6

Trillions

$4

$2

$0

Jun-14

Jun-15

Jun-16

Jun-17

Jun-18

Jun-19

Dec-14

Dec-15

Dec-16

Dec-17

Dec-18

Source: Bloomberg as of 6/30/19.

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​ The Search for Yield

YIELD

Stocks Are Cheap Relative to Bonds

• Historically, the “earnings yield” of equities (inverse of the P/E) has been just modestly above 10-year Treasury yields • Since the Global Financial Crisis, however, that spread has widened out and has yet to normalize, making equities attractive relative to bonds

S&P 500 EPS Yield

Treasury Bond Yield

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

Spread of ~400bps indicates stocks are attractive relative to bonds

6%

4%

2%

0%

1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

2018

Source: FactSet, Federal Reserve, and S&P, as of 6/30/19.

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Bond-like Equities Are in Favor ​ The Search for Yield

YIELD

• Low interest rates are driving bond-like equity sectors to trade at premiums to their historical valuations while health care appears inexpensive due in part to political issues

P/E Relative to 20-Year Median

29%

28%

23%

16%

14%

14%

14%

10%

2%

1%

-3%

-5%

Energy

Utilities

S&P 500

Materials

Financials

Industrials

Health Care

Real Estate

Consumer Staples

Information Technology

Consumer Discretionary

Communication Services

Source: FactSet and UBS, based on S&P 500 Index as of 6/30/19. The Communication Services, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors’ historical data have been restated to reflect September 2018 changes to the GICS sector classifications. Note that Consumer Discretionary ex-Internet Retail is at a 3% premium to its 20-year median.

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​ Additional Insights

INSIGHTS

After the First Cut

• Historically, stocks have gone onto produce strong gains but have occasionally also experienced losses after the first Fed rate cut • Down periods following cuts in 2001 and 2007 had the backdrop of the tech bubble and the global financial crisis, respectively, and therefore may be less analogous to the current situation

‒ Today’s environment, in terms of the economy and innovation, may resemble 1995 or 1998

S&P 500 Total Return After First Fed Cut of Cycle

1989 1995 1998 2001 2007

150

More analogous to 2019?

125

100

75

Cumulative Return Indexed to 100

50

- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months After First Fed Cut

Source: FactSet. Rate cuts occurred in June 1989, July 1995, September 1998, January 2001, and September 2007. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

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​ Additional Insights

INSIGHTS

Smaller Capitalization Stocks Poised to Outperform

• Stronger fundamentals : Estimated small cap EPS growth for ‘19 & ‘20 is double that of large cap

• Compelling valuation : Small cap P/E multiple premium is low relative to history

• More levered to domestic economy : U.S. small caps have less exposure to international economies

Price-to-Earnings Russell 2000 / Russell 1000

Earnings Per Share

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

R2000 R1000

140

Small caps growing faster

120

Median

EPS Indexed to 100

100

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2018

2019

2020

Source: FactSet as of June 2019. EPS for 2019-2020 are consensus estimates and actual earnings per share might be materially different than shown.

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​ Additional Insights

INSIGHTS

Productivity Is Improving

• A year and a half ago we called for an acceleration in productivity

• Today productivity is improving, which drives higher sustainable growth for the economy

• In our view, productivity should continue to accelerate based on robust innovation and solid business spending

U.S. Productivity Growth

3%

Alger Calls for Productivity Pick-Up

2%

1%

0%

-1%

Source: FactSet as of June 2019.

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​ Additional Insights

INSIGHTS

Election by the Numbers

• Over the past half century in presidential elections involving incumbents, a strong correlation has existed between disposable income growth and percentage of votes won • Historically, disposable income growth of nearly 2% has been needed for re-election, which is currently where it is running

U.S. Re-Election Campaigns

70%

Johnson

Nixon

60%

Reagan

Winning Campaigns

Clinton

GW Bush

Obama

50%

Current

% of Two-Party Vote

GH Bush

Losing Campaigns

Carter

40%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Real Disposable Income Growth

Source: Strategas and Alger. Historical income growth is December to October of election year, annualized, while current data point is YoY growth for May 2019.

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​ Additional Insights

INSIGHTS

Framework for Forecasting Returns

• There is a strong relationship between starting valuations and ensuing 10-year returns

• Current valuations suggest equities should produce returns lower than their historical average, but materially outperform bonds over the coming decade

= Current

= Month

S&P 500 P/E vs. 10-Year Returns

Russell 1000 Growth P/E vs. 10-Year Returns

Tech Bubble

25%

25%

R² = 0.79 (0.84 ex-tech bubble)

R² = 0.84

20%

20%

15%

15%

10%

10%

5%

5%

0%

0%

-5%

-5%

-10%

-10%

5

10

15

20

25

30

5

10

15

20

25

S&P 500 10-Year Annualized Return

Russell 1000G 10-Year Annualized Return

Russell 1000 Growth Price/Earnings

S&P 500 Price/Earnings

Source: FactSet. Each dot represents the P/E during that month and the returns generated over the subsequent 10 years. The starting P/E ratio is the price divided by the next 12-month earnings per share estimate at the start of each 10-year period measured. Monthly data through June 2019 and beginning in January 1986 (S&P 500) and December 1978 (Russell 1000 Growth). The tech bubble, represented by the 10-year returns beginning in April 1987-March 1990 and ending in April 1997-March 2000 skewed the regression by resulting in higher returns for given valuations than the historical relationship would imply. The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is not an indication or a guarantee of future results.

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Disclosure

​The views expressed are the views of Fred Alger Management, Inc. and Alger Management Ltd. (together with their affiliated entities “Alger”) as of June 2019. Alger has used sources of information which it believes to be reliable; however, this publication is not intended to be and does not constitute investment advice. These views are subject to change at any time and they do not guarantee the future performance of the markets, any security, or any funds managed by Alger.

​ Risk Disclosures : Investing in the stock market involves certain risks, and may not be suitable for all investors. Growth stocks tend to be more volatile than other stocks as their prices tend to be higher in relation to their companies’ earnings and may be more sensitive to market, political, and economic developments. Past performance is not indicative of future performance . Investors whose reference currency differs from that in which the underlying assets are invested may be subject to exchange rate movements that alter the value of their investments.

​ Important Information for US Investors: This material must be accompanied by the most recent fund fact sheet(s) if used in connection with the sale of mutual fund shares. Fred Alger & Company, Incorporated serves as distributor of the Alger mutual funds.

​ Important Information for UK Investors: The distribution of this material in the United Kingdom is restricted by law. Accordingly, this material is provided only for and is directed only at persons in the United Kingdom reasonably believed to be of a kind to whom such promotions may be communicated by an unauthorized person pursuant to an exemption under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “FPO”). Such persons include: (a) persons having professional experience in matters relating to investments and (b) high net worth bodies corporate, partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts, etc. falling within Article 49 of the FPO. Most of the rules made under the FSMA for the protection of retail clients do not apply, and compensation under the United Kingdom Financial Services Compensation Scheme will not be available. ​ Important Information for UK and EU Investors: This material is directed at investment professionals and qualified investors (as defined by MiFID/FCA regulations). It is for information purposes only and has been prepared and is made available for the benefit investors. This material does not constitute an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction in which it is not authorised or permitted, or to anyone who would be an unlawful recipient, and is only intended for use by original recipients and addressees. The original recipient is solely responsible for any actions in further distributing this material and should be satisfied in doing so that there is no breach of local legislation or regulation. ​Certain products may be subject to restrictions with regard to certain persons or in certain countries under national regulations applicable to such persons or countries. ​Alger Management, Ltd. (company house number 8634056, domiciled at 78 Brook Street, London W1K 5EF, UK) is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, for the distribution of regulated financial products and services. FAM and/or Weatherbie Capital, LLC, U.S. registered investment advisors, serve as sub-portfolio manager to financial products distributed by Alger Management, Ltd.

​Fred Alger & Company, Incorporated is not an authorized person for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 of the United Kingdom (“FSMA”) and this material has not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21(2)(b) of the FSMA.

Fred Alger & Company Incorporated • 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010 • 800.992.3863 • www.alger.com

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Disclosure

​The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the U.S. stock market without regard to company size. The S&P Composite 1500 is an unmanaged index that covers approximately 90% of the U.S. market capitalization. The Russell 1000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of the largest 1000 companies in the Russell 3000 Index with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 1000 Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 1000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 2000 Growth Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of common stocks designed to track performance of small-capitalization companies with greater than average growth orientation. The Russell 2000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of the small-cap value segment of the U.S. equity universe and measures the performance of Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000® Growth Index is an unmanaged index designed to measure the performance of those Russell 3000® Index companies with higher price-to-book ratios and higher forecasted growth values. The Russell 3000 Value Index is an unmanaged index generally representative of stocks from the Russell 3000 Index with lower price-to-book ratios and lower expected growth rates. The index covers approximately 85% of the global equity opportunity set outside the US. The indices presented are provided for illustrative purposes, reflect the reinvestment of dividends and do not assess fees and expenses that would have the effect of reducing returns. Investors cannot invest directly in any index. The index performance does not represent the returns of any portfolio advised by Fred Alger Management, Inc. and actual client results might differ materially than the indices shown. Note that past performance is no guarantee of future results. Comparison to a different index might have materially different results than those shown. ​Frank Russell Company (“Russell”) is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell ® is a trademark of Frank Russell Company. Neither Russell nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings or underlying data and no party may rely on any Russell Indexes and / or Russell ratings and / or underlying data contained in this communication. No further distribution of Russell Data is permitted without Russell’s express written consent. Russell does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. ​ ALCAPPRESSPR-0619

Fred Alger & Company Incorporated • 360 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010 • 800.992.3863 • www.alger.com

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